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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY AND A POLICY HOLDER
THE LAW of insurance is said to be predicated upon the principles of
contract, but the course of insurance litigation is marked by innumerable
deviations from standard contract analysis.' Attempts to rationalize decisions
indicate that the haphazard variations of the cases reflect the stresses en-
gendered by a powerful, though unarticulated, clash of opposing forces. On
one hand stands the legal doctrine embodied in the parol evidence nile.2
A person is supposed to know the contract that he makes, and once he
reduces his agreement to writing, he is bound; else all agreements are
futile.3 On the other hand surge the folkways of insurance buying. Since
insurance is intimately bound up with one of man's primary cultural motiva-
tions, the desire for security, its purchase is rarely transacted on a commercial
level. No process of offer and acceptance by parties in approximately equal
1. See e.g., Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 243 X. Y. 385, 393,
153 N. E. 844, 346 (1926).
2. RESTATEMFNT, CoNTRAcrS (1932) §§?237-249.
3. Boylan v. Hot Springs R. R., 132 U. S. 146 (1839); In re 'Millers' & 'Manu-
facturers' Ins. Co., 97 Mlinn. 98, 106 N. IV. 485 (1906); Metzger Y. Aetna Ins. Co.,
227 N. Y. 411, 125 N.E. 814 (1920) ; RESTATEMENT, CON-.Acrs (1932) § 70.
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bargaining positions obtains here. Contracts are invariably drawn by the
insurer's expert attorneys; the insured, rarely resorting to legal advice, does
not agree to the policies so much as adhere to them. 4 Unusual, indeed, is
the insured who at any time even reads his policy.5 The transaction, for
him, is not one of bargain but of faith. This picture of the policy holder is
silhouetted sharply against the harsh legal background of the doctrines of
warranty and uberrimae fidei.6 While in theory the requirement of highest
good faith presumably applies equally to insurer and insured, only the insured,
in the process of making full disclosures during the pre-acceptance period,
is called upon to exercise it.7 And once the policy is sold the requirement
apparently disappears, leaving between company and policy holder, by the
weight of authority, only the contract relation of debtor and creditor."
Despite this general assertion, courts frequently have endeavored to protect
the trusting policy holder from a severe contract result by invoking sueh
verbalistic devices as waiver,9 estoppel, 10 and public policy against forfeitures.11
Reformation has also been freely granted, even where the insured has not
read his policy.' 2 This makeshift resolution of the conflict, while commend-
able in purpose, has produced great uncertainty in the prediction of legal
consequences. 3 And in cases where it has failed, the result has been great
injustice to the policy holder. A re-analysis of the relationship between
insurer and insured may afford a more realistic approach to the cases.
4. MoWBRAY, INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1937) 46; Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-
Insurance Policy (1919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 198, 222, n. 106.
5. VANCE, INsURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 215.
6. Id. at 74, n. 62, 452.
7. Id. at 69, 75. Historically the requirement of uberrimae fidei applied only to the
duty of the applicant for marine insurance to disclose fully his knowledge of the rid.
MowBRAy, IxsURAxcE (2d ed. 1937) 55.
8. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S. v. Brown, 213 U. S. 25 (1909);
Coons v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 368 111. 231, 13 N. E. (2d) 482 (1938);
Uhlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. 421, 17 N. E. 363 (1888); see Timlin
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 141 Wis. 276, 284, 124 N. W. 253, 256 (1910). Contra:
(holding the relation to be one of trust) Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Kerr, 173 Ind. 613,
89 N.E. 398 (1909), rehearing denied, 173 Ind. 628, 91 N.E. 230 (1910) ; United States
Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 960, 96 S.W. 889 (1906); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc. v. Hardin, 166 Ky. 51, 178 S.W. 1155 (1915); Thomas v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., 198 Mo. App. 533, 205 S. W. 533 (1918); Ellinger v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., 132 Wis. 259, 111 N.W. 567 (1907).
9. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) c. 9, particularly p. 452.
10. Id. at 495 et seq.
11. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Henley, 125 Ark. 372, 188 S. V. 829 (1916) ; St. Louis
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Grigsby, 10 Bush 310 (Ky. 1875) ; Northwestern Mut. Life Ing. Co.
v. Fort's Adm'r, 82 Ky. 269 (1884); Bruce v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 58 Vt. 253,
2 AtI. 710 (1885).
12. Back v. People's Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 Atl. 603 (1922);
Lewitt v. Jewelers' Safety Fund Soc., 249 N. Y. 217, 164 N. E. 29 (1928).
13. See Langmaid, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law in California (1931)
20 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 41.
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The the6ry of the debtor-creditor relation had its origin at a time vhen
the principles of life insurance were imperfectly understood. It was common
belief that the entire premium paid by the policy holder was consumed in
the purchase of a fixed service for the particular year, and that the company
alone had an interest in whatever remained above costs, owing to the insured
only a debt accruing upon a contingency. 14 Now it is clear that only a part
of the premium is sufficient to pay the yearly cost of operation, the rest being
devoted to the accumulation of a reserve fund at a rate that on the average
life expectancy will amount to the face value of the policy.15 WVhatever the
composition of the insurer, the furnishing of life insurance is essentially a
mutual enterprise by the policy holders, with the company serving as admin-
istrative and investment manager for the funds accumulated from the pre-
miums. 6. And today the general interest of the insured in those funds is
well established.' 7 It is manifest in the recognition of his right to a cash
surrender value for his policy, to a guaranteed loan value, and to dividends 8
-vwhich are not dividends at all in the popular sense of the word but merely
the return to the policy holder of the excess by which his premium has been
loaded over the amount necessary for current expenses and the reserve fund
contribution.'9 Functionally, then, the writing of life insurance is a means
by which funds, in which the insured has at all times an interest, are entrusted
to managers to invest, conserve, and return upon a contingency certain to
occur.
In the leading case of Uhlznan v. Ncw York Life Insurance Comfpany.2,
the New York Court of Appeals, seeking some familiar analogy to which
it could liken the relationship between policy holder and company, concluded
that it most closely resembled that between a depositor and a bank, i.e.,
creditor and debtor. But, accepting the court's own analogy, if the depositor
in question be a member of a mutual savings bank, the institution which
functionally closest resembles an insurance company, the cases indicate that the
relation created is not debtor and creditor, but cesti and trustee.2 '
14. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 960, 967, 95 S. AN%
889, 894 (1906).
15. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 960, 967, 96 S. AV.
889, 894 (1906) ; MOWBPAY, I.NsuRANcE (2d ed. 1937) 394.
16. See (1932) 8 ExcYc. Soc. Scm.cEs 97.
17. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 960, 967, 96 S. W.
889, 894 (1906) ; MowBRAY, INsuANcE (2d ed. 1937) c. 24.
18. See Commisgioner v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 80 F. (2d) 280, 282 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935).
19. See Coons v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 363 Ill. 231, 236, 13 N. E. (2d)
482, 485 (1938).
20. 109 N. Y. 421, 17 N.E. 363 (1888).
21. See Savings Bank of Danbury v. Loewe, 242 U. S. 357, 359 (1917); Highfield
v. First Nat Bank of Rome, 45 Ga. App. 431, 438, 165 S. E. 135, 139 (1932) ; State v.
People's Nat. Bank, 75 N. H. 27, 30, 70 Ad. 542, 544 (1908).
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Selection of one or the other of these labels does not entail a choice between
concepts fundamentally at odds. Debtor-creditor and trustee-cestui are by
no means polar designations. Trustees are in some respects only debtors,
while debtors may be subjected to the fiduciary obligations of trustees. A
debtor presumably may not be said to hold his debt in trust,22 but he is in
a sense a trustee of his property, subject to a fiduciary duty not to make
a transfer which is in fraud of creditors.23 Creditors of an insolvent corpora-
tion may, at least under the "trust fund" theory, recover its assets from
stockholders or preferred distributees.24 Stockholders are commonly declared
to be creditors of a corporation, and then only when dividends are declared.2 5
Yet equity, in recognition of a fiduciary obligation in the directors, will
compel the declaration of dividends when an abuse of discretion is shown."0
Stamping the relation of insurer to insured as one of trust is less an altera-
tion of basic philosophy than a change in emphasis looking to a redefinition
of a standard of duty.
The general requisites of a trust are apparently present in the typical
life insurance set up. The insurance company is the trustee; the funds con-
tributed by policy holders constitute the res;27 and the policy holder is at once
settlor and cesti. In reality his status is very similar to that of the settlor
of a living trust who names himself beneficiary for life with a remainder
over to a designated person or to his estate.28  Conceptually, the primary
objection to this construction is the rule against the mingling of trust funds,"
but there is nothing in the policy of this rule which forbids the cestui from
consenting, directly or impliedly, to mingling.30 Indeed, since the strength
of insurance companies is derived from their ability to spread investment
22. See note 27, infra.
23. UNIFORm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 9, 10. A further indication of this
fiduciary obligation is the right of the bankruptcy trustee to demand an accounting of the
affairs of an insolvent debtor. BANKRUPTCY Act § 47a; 52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. A. § 75
(Supp. 1938).
24. Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104 (1892); Cole v. Millerton Iron Co., 133 N. Y.
164, 30 N. E. 847 (1892). The "trust fund" theory has been limited [Hollens v. Brierfield
Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371 (1893)] and criticized. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg.
and Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117 (1892).
25. Staats v. Biograph Company, 236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
26. See American Steel Foundries v. Lazear, 204 Fed. 204, 210 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913);
BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CORPORATION LAW PRACTICE (2d ed. 1930) § 157.
27: See (1932) 8 ENcYC. Soc. SCIENCES 104. Theoretical difficulty is presented by
the principle that an obligor may not hold his own obligation in trust Legis. (1937)
50 HARV. L. Rv. 511, 512], but this is obviated by looking directly to the reserve fund
as the res and not to the obligation of the insurance company to pay on death of the
insured. See Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 394, 400.
28. See Leaphart, The Trust As a Substitute for a Will (1930) 78 U. or PA. L.
REv. 626, 628.
* 29. Moore v. McKenzie, 112 Me. 356, 92 At. 296 (1914); REsrArTu,, TnusTg
(1935) § 179; 3 BOGmRT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 596.
30. Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mass. 78, 152 N. E. 71 (1926) ; REsTATEmENT, TR.USTS
(1935) §§179(e), 227 (j).
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risk, policy should encourage such practice. In recognition of the wisdom
of this procedure, several states have specifically permitted insurance com-
panies to mingle the funds of insurance trusts with their general assets.3 '
But the objection to the trust analysis most vigorously stressed by the courts
is that upon trust theory, the right of the policy holder to an accounting of
the method of distributing dividends will follow as a matter of course with-
out the necessity of alleging fraud. It is feared that, as a consequence, insur-
ance companies will be harassed by frivolous demands.32 This apprehension
appears overstated, for even though the right to an accounting be recognized,
the permissive extent of its application is still within judicial discretion.p
Courts that have adopted the trust interpretation have shown a disposition
to recognize the necessity of avoiding useless embarrassment and inconvenience
to the company, circumscribing the right to an accounting by the limits of
reasonableness. 34 Since the companies have to go through the process of
determining dividends at stated periods regardless of demand, it is not un-
reasonable to require that their calculations be made available at such times
to those properly interested.
judicial treatment of fraternal insurance cases sustains a trust analysis,
for courts have long regarded a benevolent association, incorporated or not,
as the trustee of the funds contributed by its members.:3 Early cases justified
the different treatment accorded policy holders in a benevolent association
on the theory that the issuance of insurance was merely ancillary to the pur-
pose of fraternal organizations, the plane of relationship being elevated above
a debtor-creditor status by motives of benevolence and fraternity.30 What-
ever soundness this distinction may once have possessed, the fact remains
that today the primary function of the great majority of benevolent asso-
ciations has become the selling of insurance; they differ from the commercial
companies only in the absence of the profit motive and the retention of the
open contract provision.37 Yet courts still treat the association as a trustee.39
31. Cox . Gax. STAT. (1930) § 4193; MASS. GE-,. LAws (1932) c. 175, § I9A;
P. STAT. Amx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 514; AVis. STAT. (1937) § 206.39.
32. Everson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 68 Fed. 258 (N. D. Pa. 1S95),
aff'd, 71 Fed. 570 (C. C.A. 3d, 1896); Peters v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 200
Mass. 579, 86 N. E. 885 (1909); Uhlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. 421,
17 N. E. 363 (1888).
33. Shaw v. Beaumont, 88 N. J. Eq. 333, 102 Atl. 151 (1917).
34. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Hardin, 166 Ky. 51, 178 S.AV. 1155 (1915);
Miller v. New York Life Ins. Co., 179 Ky. 246, 20 S. AV. 482 (1918).
35. Die Gross-Loge Des Ordens Der Hermanns-Suehme Im Staate Colo. v. Wolfer,
42 Colo. 393, 94 Pac. 329 (1908) ; Kane v. Knights of Columbus, 84 Conn. 96, 79 AtI.
63 (1911) ; National Circle, Daughters of Isabella v. Hines, 83 Conn. 676, 92 At. 401
(1914).
36. Commonwealth v. Equitable Beneficial Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412, 18 Ad. 1112 (1890);
see Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 140 (1918).
37. Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 965, 970, n. 34, 972, n. 51, 52. But see Comment
(1938) 33 ILrL L. REv. 281.
38. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Alabama
(Colored) v. Callier, 224 Ala. 364, 140 So. 557 (1932) ; Donovan v. Danielhon, 271 Mass,
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Stare decisis offers one explanation, but equally possible is the conclusion
that the courts, free in the light of changed circumstances to adopt an inde-
pendent construction, have selected the trust analysis.
The utility of the trust interpretation may be tested by its application to
four types of cases. The duty of the insurer to forestall lapse of a policy
if there be within its possession funds to maintain it is often asserted; yet
courts proceeding on the usual contract theory frequently arrive at the harsh
results demonstrated in Williams v. Union Central Life Insurance Company.39
The insured failed to meet a premium payment on time, but a dividend had
been declared by the company, which if applied in reduction of the amount
advanced on the policy would have extended protection beyond the date of
the death of the policy-holder. The insurer, contending that since the insured
failed to exercise any of the options in the policy the dividend was merely
payable in cash, allowed the policy to lapse. This action was sustained by
the United States Supreme Court. Despite the retention by the company
of funds clearly owing to the insured and sufficient to protect his policy, his
beneficiaries thus received nothing except the surrender value of the policy.
Under a trust analysis, the company as the fiduciary of the insured would
not only be privileged but bound to act in the insured's best interest, which
would mean, almost without exception, the maintenance of the policy. 0
Petitions for reformation of insurance policies are frequently before the
courts; but hazardous indeed is the prediction of the results in a particular
case.41 Companies lean heavily on their salesmen in selling insurance, but
they are careful to disclaim any responsibility for the representations of these
agents. The first officially recognized communication between company and
prospective insured occurs with the issuance of the policy. Thus the insurer,
while reaping the benefits of pressure salesmanship, often avoids liability for
the legal consequences of the agent's representations. This aspect of insurance
law, now continually muddied by the unrealistic doctrine of mutual mistale,42"
can be clarified by raising the insurer's standard of duty. Either the insurer
should bear from the beginning of negotiations a fiduciary obligation to issue
to the insured the policy its agent's representations have given him reasonable
267, 171 N. E. 823 (1930); Shafran v. St. Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Sick
and Death Ben. Soc. of Passaic, N. J., 117 N. J. Eq. 54, 175 Ati. 139 (1934).
39. 291 U. S. 170 (1934). See also Moore v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 86 F. (2d) 197
(C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Coons v. Home Life Ins, Co., 368 II. 231, 13 N. E. (2d) 482
(1938), (1938) 32 Ia. L. Rv. 744; Notes (1920) 6 A. L. R. 1400, (1927) 47 A. L, R.
452, (1934) 92 A. L. R. 702, 712 and cases cited.
40. Cf. Finley v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 La. 477, 134 So. 399 (1931)
(disregards terms of policy to raise a duty to maintain policy).
41. Compare Swede v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 5th,
1938) (denying reformation) with Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S. v. Saurman,
126 Pa. Super. 184, 190 AtI. 422 (1937) (permitting 'reliance by insured on agent's
representations).
42. See generally, VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 71.
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cause to believe he was buying; or it should inform him adequately concern-
ing the nature of the policy actually delivered.
The theory that insurer and insured stand merely in the relation of debtor
and creditor is upon occasion employed to justify retention by the insurer of
premiums paid on a non-insurable interest. In Harse v. Pearl Life Assurance
Company43 an agent had sold a policy by telling the plaintiff that he had an
insurable interest in his mother's life. Although under wen-settled law the
policy holder had no such interest, the company accepted premiums from
him, and upon his discovery that the policy was void, denied him a refund.
Finding that agent and policy holder had both misapprehended the law, the
court disallowed recovery of the premiums. It added that the plaintiff was
bound unless he could show "a difference in the position of the parties which
created a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff, so as to make it inequitable
for the defendants to insist on the bargain." Although the agent might have
been in error, there can be no real doubt that the company was at all times
fully aware of the true nature of the plaintiff's interest. It is equally clear
that the policy holder knew, and commonly would know, only the law% that
the agent had told him. The difference in position between the parties to
which the court referred is so generally evident that to demand its formal
proof is superfluous. With the acceptance of a trust interpretation, the
necessity of demonstrating the obvious is removed; for the fiduciary rela-
tion, under which retention of premiums by the insurer would be patently
unjust, is automatically supplied.
The far reaching implications of the right to an accounting are illustrated
by Rhine v. Nc-w York Life Insurance Company.44 Plaintiff had purchased
a combined life and disability policy. Owing to insufficient actuarial experience
and numerous and successful depression-inspired attempts to "fake" disabili-
ties, the company failed to charge enough for the disability risk, and a huge
loss resulted. 45 To compensate for the deficit, the company thereupon de-
creased only the dividends payable to the holders of the combined policies.
If dividends had not been curtailed, insolvency eventually might have ensued.
The standard procedure is to spread any loss by deducting from the dividends
of all policy holders, pro rata. But since a strong case can be made for
restricting the loss to those who stood to benefit by reason of the disability
clauses in their policies,46 the propriety of the company's action is not here
43. [1904] 1 K B. 558 (C.A.). The leading American case is American Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Mead, 39 Ind. App. 215, 79 N. E. 526 (1906). Contra: IMetrupolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Blesch, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 530, 58 S. AV. 436 (1900) ; Interstate Life & Accident
Co. v. Cook, 19 Tenn. App. 290, 86 S. IV. (2d) 887 (1935).
44. 273 N. Y. 1, 6 N. E. (2d) 74 (1936), Comment (1937) 50 H.%uwv. L. REV. 790,
(1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. RZv. 541.
45. Comment (1937) 50 HAv. L. REv. 790, 792, n. 7, 10 (behvcen 1920 and 1930
loss amounted to forty million dollars).
46. Cf. Carpenter -%. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of America, 10 Cal.
(2d) 307, 74 P. (2d) 761 (1937), aff'd sub nora. Neblett . Carpenter, 59 Sup. Ct. 170
(U. S. 1938), rehearing denicd, 59 Sup. Ct. 359 (U. S. 1938).
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questioned. 47 The major objection is that faced under a conventional analysis
with the necessity of proving fraud in order to secure an accounting by which
to challenge the insurer's conduct, the policy holder's task is almost insuper-
able. Under a trust interpretation, however, the policy holder could require
as of right that the company, at a convenient time, justify its action before
a court of equity.
The peripheral implications of a trust analysis may present additional con-
ceptual difficulties, 48 but preponderantly in its favor is the fact that it expresses
reality. A fiduciary attitude is the norm, and companies should be placed
under a correspondingly higher duty to deal fairly with policy holders. Under
a trust theory each case, instead of being subjected to the erratic application
of the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and policy against forfeiture, would be
determined in the light of the fundamental proposition that insurer owes to
policy holder the highest good faith, not only in selling him his policy but
in protecting his interests in subsequent dealings. Certainly if the require-
ment of uberrimae fidei has legal validity, it should apply at all times to
insurer as well as to insured.
47. Opposing arguments of equal cogency are available under the trust theory. If
each class of policy holders be deemed contributors to a separate fund, it may be justly
claimed that to exact contributions from one fund to balance a deficit in another is a
breach of the first trust. But if all policy holders are considered as contributing to a
common fund, it is presumably inequitable to burden only part of them with a loss.
48. If a trustee loses property without negligence, he is, unlike a debtor, excused
from liability. Fear may arise that this would in some respects impair the security of
the policy holders. Practically, however, this offers no real problem, for any loss
honestly incurred is distributed throughout the entire company and rests on no single
policy holder. Moreover, the higher standard of care demanded by a fiduciary relation-
ship would be more than likely to compensate for possible disadvantages. See Comment
(1926) 36 YALE L. J. 396, n. 4.
The fact that as between the insurer and insured the insurer is held to the fiduciary
obligations of a trustee instead of merely the duties of a debtor has no necessary effect
on the relations between the insured and third persons. However, even if attempts are
made to apply all the conceptual concomitants that flow from a trust designation, no
appreciable alteration in relationship should follow. Those interests which a creditor
could reach if the insured's interest were purely legal, [VANCE, INStURANCE (2d ed. 1930)
§§ 161, 162] are almost as available if the interest be deemed equitable. 1 Boc.en'r,
TuE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 193. In some jurisdictions procedural
restrictions may confine an action to equity, but in many states the interest of a cesill
can be reached at law. 1 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, at 546. In the absence of express
restriction or statute a cestid may alienate his interest as freely as he might a legal
interest. 1 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, at § 188, n. 3.
In all events, designation of the insured's interest as equitable instead of legal should
not change his relation to his beneficiary, or his beneficiary's status with respect to the
insurer. VANCE, op. cit. supra, at § 146 (insured is a trustee of the insurer's promise
for the use of the beneficiary) ; 1 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, at § 113, n. 36 (deeming it well
settled that equitable interests may be held by trustees). See generally, Vance, The
Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 343.
